The Covid Inquiry Has Failed to Engage With the Evidence

The Covid Inquiry Module Two report has been published. The report is thorough, but its reasoning often takes premises at face value. It fails to question faulty assumptions and draws conclusions without adequately considering alternative explanations.

The report repeatedly claims that governments acted on scientific advice that later proved incorrect (for example, assumptions about asymptomatic transmission and “behavioural fatigue”). However, it does not explore why these assumptions were accepted uncritically, why the scientific advisers did not challenge them, or why the Chair and her KCs chose not to challenge them.

The report dedicates significant sections to recounting events in a timeline format, but it lacks a strong analytical framework. Conclusions like “too little, too late” are stated without thorough justification. The emphasis on chronology rather than analysis results in insufficient evidence and reasoning to fully understand what transpired.

The report demonstrates a complete failure to consider existing knowledge of respiratory viruses, both past and present, in its study of transmission. Additionally, it lacks an analysis of the devastating consequences of the 200 measures that were implemented. It does not address the issue of healthcare-associated infections or explore what caused the high number of deaths. Furthermore, the amateurish approach to attributing deaths to Covid — using 14 different definitions — was completely overlooked.

The report goes on to cite modelling, reporting that a lockdown one week earlier might have saved 23,000 lives, but there is no interrogation of the inherent uncertainty in such modelling. It accepts the ‘reasonable worst-case scenario’ without probing why alternative models were not stress-tested. There was blind faith in models, but no curiosity about whether their inputs were garbage, which they were.

The report repeatedly states governments were “too slow,” but does not critically compare UK decision-making with that of other countries, especially the strange Scandinavian country that it mentions in passing (see page 292). A critical thinker would ask: what did others know or infer that the UK did not?

Many statements (e.g. “too little, too late”, “inexcusable”) reflect the Inquiry Chair’s value judgements but are presented as factual conclusions without fully articulated chains of reasoning. The statement that lockdowns could have been “avoided entirely” during the pandemic had ministers reacted more quickly is grounded in the Chair’s opinion. The harder, faster approach is rooted in the ridiculous zero-Covid notion.

The report relies heavily on hypotheticals rather than demonstrated causation. Words like “could” and “might” are classic markers of speculation: ‘X could have reduced deaths’ means we don’t actually know; we’re inferring. ‘Y might have been avoided’ means we lack definitive data, but we’re guessing based on incomplete, faulty modelling.

Much of the report’s analysis, especially its analysis of lockdown timing, depends on mathematical models. Models are not evidence; they are predictions based on assumptions, often with enormous uncertainty – even Sir Patrick Vallance told us this.

The use of “could” and “might” reveals this shortcoming (“could” appears 313 times in volume one, “might” a mere 138 times), forcing the authors to soften their claims, as they cannot say “would”, only “might have” – giving the illusion of objectivity while avoiding accountability.

These linguistic markers indicate uncertainty, speculation and cautious bureaucratic thinking, underscoring the report’s lack of true evidence-based reasoning.

The UK was unprepared and remains so because of its reluctance to address the uncertainties about what works and what doesn’t: the report does nothing to correct this shortcoming.

However, for just shy of £200 million, what were you expecting?

The lockdowns were inevitable only because critical thinking was and is still absent.

This post was written by two old geezers who searched Baroness Hallett’s report and found 140 citations to “evidence”, but none to “systematic reviews”.

Dr Carl Heneghan is the Oxford Professor of Evidence Based Medicine and Dr Tom Jefferson is an epidemiologist based in Rome who works with Professor Heneghan on the Cochrane Collaboration. This article was first published on their Substack, Trust the Evidence, which you can subscribe to here.

Stop Press: In the Telegraph, Lord Frost calls the report a “disgrace“, saying those who produced it should hang their heads in shame. Particularly ludicrous is its criticism of not locking down when Omicron arrived in late 2021 because, although in the event it all turned out fine, that was only by good luck and the government shouldn’t have taken the risk!