What a Peace Deal for Ukraine Might Look Like

Diverse commentators, including Viktor Orbán, Noam Chomsky, Barry Posen, Peter Hitchens, Henry Kissinger and Robert Wright, have called for a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine. I too have been suggesting this almost since day one.

Last week, the former head of the British Army Lord Dannatt said, “Russia is not going to lose … The Russians will never go voluntarily. I can’t see the circumstances whereby the Ukrainians will ever be strong enough to throw them out.” He added that at some point Zelensky’s military commanders will have to tell him, “President Zelensky, sir, you’ve got to start negotiating.”

So what would a diplomatic solution look like? Well, it needs to be something that both sides can accept. And it should aim to preserve geopolitical stability as far as possible.

At the start of the war, I would have suggested an agreement like the one John Mearsheimer put forward in 2014: neutrality for Ukraine (no NATO integration); autonomy for the two Donbas regions; and recognition of Crimea as Russian territory. But I fear it’s too late for that now: unless defeated, Russia isn’t going to give back the Donbas.

Something along the following lines seems more realistic: the two Donbas regions go to Russia, along with Crimea; the Sea of Azov becomes a demilitarised zone; Russia withdraws its forces; Ukraine gets defensive weapons but does not join NATO. One might add further stipulations like: Ukraine must opt out of long-range missiles; and NATO must not admit new members on Russia’s border.

Now, I’m not pretending this deal is ‘fair’. And it’s entirely possible that one or both parties would reject it outright. At the present time, Russia occupies vast swathes of southern Ukraine, which under my proposal they would have to give back. So unless the course of the war changes dramatically in Ukraine’s favour, the Ukrainians are unlikely to get a better deal than this.

Why do I say the Donbas should go to Russia, and not other regions that Russia is occupying? Survey data collected prior to the invasion suggest there’s considerable support for separatism in the Donbas, but not elsewhere.

A 2014 survey commissioned by Ivan Katchanovski (the scholar who’s done all the work on the Maidan Massacre) found that a sizeable share of Donbas residents favoured some form of separatism. However, his survey found almost no support for separatism in other regions of Ukraine – contrary to Russian claims at the time.

A 2019 survey commissioned by the researcher Gwendolyn Sasse yielded broadly similar results, though found dramatic differences between government and separatist-controlled areas.

A 2020 survey carried out by Sasse and her colleagues found even starker differences, with more than half of residents in separatist-controlled areas wishing to join Russia, compared to less than 15% who wished to remain part of Ukraine.  

Interestingly, the latest survey from this group of researchers – carried out in January – found that 50% of Donbas residents in both government and separatist-controlled areas agreed with the statement, “It doesn’t matter to me in which country I live: all I want is a good salary and then a good pension.” Which highlights the despair people evidently feel after more than eight years of war.

Transferring the separatist-controlled areas of Donbas to Russia would help preserve geopolitical stability, while respecting the self-determination of the largely ethnic Russian population living there. However, the same cannot be said of the other regions Russia is occupying – as Katchanovski’s survey indicates.

So how would we get Russia to accept the deal? One approach would be to issue an ultimatum of the form, ‘If you reject the deal, the West will supply Ukraine with more heavy weapons’. Since supplying such weapons is what Western hawks want to do anyway, why not use them as leverage in negotiations first? Another approach would be to make the resumption of friendly relations conditional on accepting the deal.

Regarding the latter suggestion, a hawk might respond that offering to resume friendly relations is unlikely to bring Russia around, since Russia currently has the upper hand – thanks to Europe’s ongoing energy crisis. But this is all the more reason to negotiate now, rather than later, since Europe’s energy crisis will only worsen over the next few months, further undermining the West’s bargaining position.

Some commentators might find the idea of negotiating with Russia objectionable, even offensive. But they have to remember: the choice isn’t between negotiations and certain Ukrainian victory. It’s between negotiations and the continuation of fighting, which may or may not lead to Ukrainian victory, and could produce an outcome far worse.

As Hitchens reminds us, “Almost all wars end in ugly compromise.”